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MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. THEOFILOS:
FUMBLING FOR A STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
Theoretically, a practicing attorney in Ohio must tailor his conduct to meet
certain minimum professional standards adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court.'
In reality however, an attorney suddenly may find himself confronted with a
disciplinary proceeding because of judicial inconsistency and ambiguity within
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Mahoning County Bar Ass 'n v.
Theofilos,2 the Ohio Supreme Court faced an issue representative of "borderline"
conduct.3 Unfortunately, the court sidestepped this timely opportunity to provide
some much-needed guidance for the legal profession. In Theofilos, the attorney
knew a client only four months before drafting a will for her which named the
attorney and his son as beneficiaries. Subsequently, the attorney received a one-
year suspension.4
BACKGROUND
An attorney whose practice includes estate planning and will-drafting may
often engage in conduct which, albeit commonly acceptable by fellow probate
practitioners, brushes precariously close to Code violations. Prevalent examples
include: the drafting attorney's "safekeeping" a client's will in the attorney's of-
fice, 5 the drafting attorney being named as executor of the estate,6 and the draft-
ing attorney being named as a beneficiary in the client's will. The situation in
which the drafting attorney is also a beneficiary raises the most serious questions
of ethical conduct. This dual status places the attorney in a position to alternatively
gain and lose a great deal because "there are serious professional, ethical, and
practical considerations at stake in connection with such a gift that may far
'The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter Code] in 1974.
The preface to the Code explains that the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory, and establish the "minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." However, the Ethical
Considerations [hereinafter EC] of the Code are "aspirational in character and represent objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive."
236 Ohio St. 3d 43, 521 N.E.2d 797 (1988).
'See generally Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices--Is Good Business Bad
Ethics?, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 57 (1984). Johnston observes that "many of the practices have gone unquestioned,
and many of the lawyers engaged in estate planning do not fully appreciate the ethical concerns that their ac-
tivities raise." Id. at 59. See also State v. Beaudry, 53 Wis. 2d 148, 156 191 N.W.2d 842, 846 (1972), wherein
the court stated, "An attorney who sees how close he can come to the line of demarcation always runs the
risk of overstepping."
4 Theofilos, 36 Ohio St. 3d 43, 521 N.E.2d 797 (1988).
'See Johnston, supra note 3, at 125. Johnston states that by safekeeping a client's will, an attorney may be
unethically soliciting future employment because after the testator dies, the executor must obtain the will from
the drafting attorney.
'Id. at 88 & n.191. Such conduct may violate EC 5-6 of the Code, which states in part that "a lawyer should
not consciously influence a client to name him as executor... in an instrument." See supra note I. See general-
ly Comment, Considerations of Professional Responsibility in Probate Matters, 51 NEB. L. REy. 456 (1972).
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outweigh any pecuniary advantages. ' 7 Typically, the attorney-as-beneficiary case
arises in two contexts: (1) in disciplinary proceedings brought against the attorney-
beneficiary,8 or (2) in challenges to a will which names the attorney as beneficiary.9
Historically, courts have cast suspicious glances upon the attorney who
drafted a will in which he was named as a beneficiary.'0 However, early American
courts were receptive to leaving certain options open to the drafting attorney. In-
deed, one early case' stated:
There is no rule that attorneys should never draw wills in which they receive
gifts. There is nothing improper in an attorney's drawing wills for his family
or for relatives, provided that the gift to him is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. Similarly, there is nothing improper in drawing wills for close
friends or for clients if the gift to the attorney is a modest one.
1 2
State v. Horan '3 was the first case to articulate the strict rule that beneficiaries
should not serve as drafting attorneys. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court diluted
the standard by listing several exceptions: 'A lawyer may draft a will for his wife,
his children, or his parents, or other close relatives, in which he is a beneficiary
and stands in the relationship to the testator as one being the natural object of the
testator's bounty." 4 Faced with similar circumstances, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court attempted to rearticulate and trim the Horan guidelines five years later in
State v. Collentine. 15
7Schwab, The Lawyer as Beneficiary, TEx. B.J. 1422 (1982); see also Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d
423, 430, 374 P.2d 807, 811, 24 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1962), wherein the court stated, "[A]II business deal-
ings between attorney and client whereby the attorney benefits are closely scrutinized for any unfairness on
the attorney's part."
'See, e.g., Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 58 Cal. 2d 423, 374 P.2d 807, 24 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1962); State v. Horan,
21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831
(1972); In re Krotenberg, 111 Ariz. 251, 527 P.2d 510 (1974).
9See, e.g., Estate of Pedrick, 505 Pa. 530, 482 A.2d 215 (1984). In Pedrick, the attorney visited the dying
testator in the hospital and drew a will which named him beneficiary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
disallowed the distribution and noted that the attorney's conduct "shocks the conscience of this Court." Id.
at 546, 482 A.2d at 223.
1°For a brief historical discussion in this area, see Schwab, supra note 7, at 1422, who writes that, under Roman
law, "one who wrote himself heir in a will could take no benefit thereunder."
"Magee, 58 Cal.2d 423, 374 P.2d 807,24 Cal. Rptr. 839. In Magee, the California Board of Bar Governors
charged that the defendant "abused the confidence placed in him" by his elderly client and recommended
a two-year suspension from practice. The California Supreme Court noted that an attorney who drafts a will
naming himself as a beneficiary takes certain riskss. However, the court held that the defendant rebutted the
presumption of undue influence which arose in drawing the will because another attorney had witnessed the
will, taken the testator aside, and questioned her about her wishes and whether the will accurately reflected
those wishes. Magee, 58 Cal.2d at 429-30, 374 P.2d at 811, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
121d. at 433, 374 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
1321 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963). In Horan, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reprimanded an attorney
who drew several wills for close friends, all naming the attorney as a beneficiary. The court noted that the
attorney should have "insisted that a disinterested attorney of the client's own choosing be engaged to draft
the will . . ., or at least he should have taken such action with his client's consent and approval after being
fully advised as would make available the testimony he foreclosed himself from giving by becoming a
beneficiary." Id. at 73, 123 N.W.2d at 491.
141d. at 74, 123 N.W.2d at 492.
1539 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
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In order to prevent future misunderstandings, we conclude and establish as
a rule for prospective application that a lawyer may be the scrivener of a will
in which he is a beneficiary only when he stands in relationship to the testator
as the natural object of the testator's bounty and where under the will he
receives no more than would be received by law in the absence of a will.
Under any other circumstances in which the lawyer-draftsman is a
beneficiary, this court will conclude that the preparation of such a will con-
stitutes unprofessional conduct.' 6
Mounting judicial intolerance for wills which named a drafting attorney as
a beneficiary resulted in the Wisconsin Supreme Court revising its position. In
State v. Gulbankan,17 the court held that the Collentine standard should be ex-
tended to prohibit the drafting of a will in which a close relative of the attorney
is a beneficiary. 8 Attorney Gulbankan received a sixty-day suspension for draft-
ing a will for a longtime friend who named Gulbankan's sister as beneficiary.t9
In Columbus Bar Ass 'n v. Ramey,20 the Ohio Supreme Court held that an at-
torney who drafted both a will and trust which named him sole beneficiary and
trustee "clearly" violated EC 5-5.21 Attorney Ramey was given only a public repri-
mand. 22 While it may have been out of step with its judicial peers, 23 this
disciplinary measure serves as an important piece in the evolution of a growing
16M. at 332, 159 N.W.2d at 53. The Collentine court noted that, though the standard may result in "occasional
inconvenience" to attorneys, "the problems that are inherent in the drawing of an unnatural will far outweigh
such inconveniences." Id. at 333, 159 N.W.2d at 53-54. But see Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d
433 (N.D. 1980), which rejected the "strict" approach of Collentine and held that, "under exceptional cir-
cumstances" an attorney may draw a will naming himself as a beneficiary. Id. at 442. The court found that
the attorney's close, lifelong relationship with the testator, and the testator's insistence, after disclosure, that
the attorney draft his will, constituted exceptional circumstances. For a case involving another adamant client,
see In re Barrick, 87 I11. 2d 233, 429 N.E.2d 842 (1981).
1754 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972).
/8 1d. at 604, 196 N.W.2d at 732.
19 d. at 599, 196 N.W.2d at 730.
2032 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E.2d 831 (1972).
2
"Id. at 98, 290 N.E.2d at 835. The court also weighed other factors in its decision, including the attorney's
short acquaintance with the testator, and the testator's condition as a "distressed, confused woman ... " Id.
at 98, 290 N.E.2d at 836. EC 5-5 of the Code provides as follows:
A lawyer should not suggest to his client that a gift be made to himself or for his benefit. It a lawyer
accepts a gift from his client, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge that he unduly influenced or
overeached the client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept
the gift, but before doing so, he should urge that his client secure disinterested advice from an indepen-
dent, competent person who is cognizant of all the circumstances. Other than in exceptional cir-
cumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him beneficially
be prepared by another lawyer selected by the client.
2 2Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d at 100, 290 N.E.2d at 837.
2 3Cf Committee on Professional Ethics v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1979) (an attorney who drafted several
wills which named him contingent beneficiary and executor received an indefinite suspension); Committee
on Professional Ethics v. Sylvester, 318 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1982) (an attorney who drafted a will for a close
friend and was named a beneficiary received an indefinite suspension for his conduct, both in drafting the
will and in delaying probating the estate; Krotenberg, III Ariz. 251, 527 P2d 510 (1974) (an attorney who drafted
a will which named him beneficiary violated his "fiduciary duty" to his client and received a six-month suspen-
sion); Gulbankan, 54 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972) (an attorney who drafted a will for a long-time
family friend, which named the attorney's sister as beneficiary, received a sixty-day suspension).
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contempt for such conduct.
The formulation of the present accepted standard, commencing with Horan,24
tightened in Collentine, 25 and fine-tuned in Gulbankan .26 evinces a spreading in-
tolerance for the attorney-beneficiary in a client's will.27 In Theofilos,28 the Ohio
Supreme Court missed a prime opportunity to set the modem standard for Ohio,
while simultaneously furthering the goal of promoting an ethical bar.
FACTS
Mahoning County Bar Ass 'n v. Theofilos 29 arose out of a complaint filed in
1986 by the Mahoning County Bar Association against attorney Gus K. Theofilos,
alleging a single count of misconduct.30 The Bar Association later amended its
complaint to charge specifically that Theofilos violated Disciplinary Rules
1-102(A)(4) 3t and 5-101(A),32 and Ethical Considerations 5-533 and 5-634 of the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility in preparing a will for Philomena G.
Dailey.35
Philomena G. Dailey retained Gus K. Theofilos in 1984 to probate the will
of her sister Elizabeth Dailey.36 Elizabeth's will had named Philomena as exec-
utor.37 Both Elizabeth and Philomena had executed identical wills, each leaving
her respective assets to the other.38 Theofilos informed Philomena that, because
Elizabeth had predeceased her, Philomena's will could be ineffectual and, as a
result, Philomena's assets would pass to her next of kin.39 Philomena regularly
visited Theofilos' office for personal matters during the last three months of 1984
2421 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
2539 Wis. 2d 325, 159 N.W.2d 50 (1968).
2654 Wis. 2d 599, 196 N.W.2d 730 (1972).
27For a discussion of other standards, see generally Comment, supra note 6, and Johnston, supra note 3.
2836 Ohio St. 3d 43, 521 N.E.2d 797 (1988).
2 9 1d.
301d.
311Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) [hereinafter DR] of the Code provides in part as follows: "A lawyer shall not
... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."
32 DR 5-101(A) of the Code provides as follows: "Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure,
a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will
be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests."
33See supra note 1.
34 EC 5-6 of the Code provides as follows: "A lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him
as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as
such, care should be taken to avoid even the appearance of impropriety."
35Theofilos, 36 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 798.
36 1d. at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 797.
371d.
381d. at 44, 521 N.E.2d at 797.
391d. at 44, 521 N.E.2d at 797-98.
40 d. at 44, 521 N.E.2d at 798. The last three months of 1984 was the time period during which Theofilos
handled Elizabeth's estate. Id.
[Vol. 22:2
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Their discussions turned to Theofilos' son Ian, and Theofilos testified at the Board
of Commissioners' hearing that Philomena had expressed interest in Ian's educa-
tion.4'
In January, 1985, Philomena told Theofilos that she wanted him to draft her
a new will in which she would leave her savings bonds to Ian, for his education.
2
Theofilos testified that on several occasions he suggested to Philomena that she
consider retaining another attorney to draft the will. 3 She declined, saying, "I
don't think I want to go to any other attorney." 44 Eventually, Theofilos did draft
the will which named his son and himself as beneficiaries 5 Philomena died on
June 18, 198546 Philomena's entire estate did not pass through probate, as The-
ofilos had established joint and survivorship bank accounts in both their names. 7
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar found
that Theofilos violated EC 5-5 because he "did not 'insist' that [she] consult other
'independent counsel' before he drafted her will, but merely suggested that she
'consider' seeing another attorney." 48 The Board also relied on the fact that
Theofilos became acquainted with Philomena over a period of only four months
before he drafted her will, and that Theofilos offered no evidence to "offset [his]
particular susceptibility to charges of undue influence." 49 The Board conclud-
ed that Theofilos' conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(6),50 and recommended that he
be suspended from practice in Ohio for six months.5'
The case arrived at the Ohio Supreme Court on certified report by the
Board.52 The court, in a per curiam opinion, agreed that Theofilos violated DR
1-102(A)(6).53 The scanty one-paragraph opinion adopted, without explanation,
the Board's findings, but found that Theofilos' conduct required a more severe
sanction than six months. Thus, it ordered him suspended for one year.5 4 Justice
Holmes dissented, stating that he would require Theofilos to return the money
he received as a condition for reinstatement 5
4 1
1d.
421d. The savings bonds were valued at approximately $6,600.
4 3
1d.
"Id.
451d. Theofilos was also named executor of the estate.
46
1d
.
47d. at 44-45, 521 N.E.2d at 798. The bank accounts were established with Philomena's authorization. Id.
41d. at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799.
4 9
1d.
5 0
1d.
5 1
1d.
52d. at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 797.
53d. at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799.
54
1d.
5Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS
"The practice of the law is not a business but a profession - a form of public
trust, the performance of which is entrusted only to those who can qualify by
fitness, not the least of which is good moral character." 56 While this statement
may be unduly idealistic for the modem attorney, it does serve as a useful paragon
by which one should model his practice. However, without proper professional
guidance from bar associations, legislatures, and judiciaries, the attorney prac-
tices in the dark . 7 The Theofilos court shirked its responsibility to the profession
when it: (1) failed to address the true problems inherent in "attorney-as-bene-
ficiary" situations, and thus failed to adopt the appropriate standards for Ohio;
and (2) erroneously affirmed the Board's finding of a DR 1-102(A)(6) violation,
when other Code provisions directly address the issue.
The Problems Created by an Attorney-Draftsman Serving as Beneficiary
The problems an attorney faces when drafting a will which names him as
beneficiary are manifold. Among these recurrent concerns identified by the courts
are: the attorney's potential conflict of interest, the attorney's lack of competen-
cy to testify in a will contest, the possible ineffectuality of a will if contested,
5 8
and an erosion of public confidence in the legal profession.5 9 Additionally, some
jurisdictions presume that the testator acted under undue influence when the draft-
ing attorney is also a named beneficiary.6 The Ohio Supreme Court held correctly
in sanctioning Theofilos. Although Theofilos suggested that Philomena retain
another attorney, he did not "insist" that she do so.6' His conduct was clearly con-
trary to the present trend toward absolute prohibition.6 2 Further, his conduct was
arguably violative of the lesser standard of EC 5-5, which states that the attorney
should "urge" that the testator obtain independent advice.63 Additionally,
Theofilos' relationship with Philomena consisted only of her occasional visits to
his office, stretched over a mere four-month period.6 4 The brevity and context of
the relationship, coupled with the lack of independent advice, accounted for
56 Horan, 21 Wis. 2d at 70, 123 N.W.2d at 489-90.
57See Johnston, supra note 3, at 59: "[M]any of the lawyers engaged in estate planning do not fully appreciate
the ethical concerns their activities raise."
58See In re Vogel, 92 Il1. 2d 55, 61 440 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1982) ("thus harming other beneficiaries and possibly
nullifying the testator's intended distribution of his estate.")
59See generally id. See also Johnston, supra note 3, at 60-61.
60See Younger, 314 Pa. Super. 480,494-95, 461 A.2d 259,266 (1983). See also Comment, Estate of Younger:
Violation of an Ethical Consideration Equals a Legal Presumption, 45 U. PrIr. L.R. 719 (1984).
61Theofilos, 36 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799.
62 See, e.g., Collentine, 39 Wis. 2d at 332, 159 N.E.2d at 53: "When testator wishes to have his attorney draft
a will in which the attorney is entitled to anything more than he would be at law, it is the absolute duty of the
attorney to refuse to act."
63See supra note 1.
6436 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799. See also Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91,290 N.E.2d 831 (1972) (testator
had seen attorney only once).
[Vol. 22:2
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Theofilos' "particular susceptibility to charges of undue influence. 65
While the issue of Theofilos' violation of the Code seems clear, the supreme
court's reticence in failing to articulate a feasible standard for borderline situa-
tions is puzzling. The court's one-paragraph per curiam opinion serves little pur-
pose other than to add to the confusion. The court missed an opportunity to adopt
a standard which would put Ohio in line with the growing trend toward absolute
prohibition of such conduct, as put forth in Horan and Collentine. Thus, while
the "admonishments and reprimands of the 1950s and 1960s have become the
suspensions and disbarments of the 1970's and 1980's" 66 Ohio attorneys still lack
clear guidelines for ethical conduct.
DR 1-102 (A) (6): The Correct Code Section to Apply to the Attorney-Draftsman
as Beneficiary?
The Board and the Ohio Supreme Court correctly identified Theofilos' con-
duct as unethical, and disciplined him in accordance with current practice.6 7
However, when the court adopted the board's finding of a DR 1-102(A)(6) viola-
tion, it clouded the underlying issue.
DR 1-102(A)(6) mandates that a lawyer shall not "engage in any other con-
duct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." 68 This provision
arguably could be construed to address Theofilos' conduct, as the provision is
quite broad. However, the Code directly addresses the issue of attorney-draftsmen
as beneficiaries in EC 5-569 and in DR 5-101(A) 7 o DR 5-101(A) is the provision
of the Code which most directly addresses the major problem inherent in the
attorney-draftsman serving as beneficiary. "The potential for abuse in the clash
of roles is serious enough that the attorney must be deemed to suffer from a con-
flict of interest, and some effect (on the attorney's independent professional judg-
ment) must be presumed possible."'7 Therefore, the Code presumes that the at-
torney who drafts a will in which he is named a beneficiary might be more in-
clined to protect and secure his own future financial and proprietary interests under
the will, at the expense of other, more deserving, beneficiaries. DR 5-101(A) ad-
dresses such a potential problem.
No reported cases have been decided solely on DR 1-102(A)(6) violations.
That the Ohio Supreme Court chose to do so in Theofilos is at least unfortunate.
6536 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799.
6 6Johnston, supra note 3, at 70.
67 For examples of discipline, see supra note 23.
6 8See supra note 1.
6936 Ohio St. 3d at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 799.
7
"Seesupra note 1. See, e.g., Vogel, 92 Il1. 2d 55, 440 N.E. 2d 885 (1982). Although the Board of Commis-
sioners charged Theofilos with a DR 5-101(A) violation, why it did not rest its findings on a violation of this
particular provision remains unclear.
71Barrick, 87 Il. 2d at 233, 429 N.E.2d at 842.
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In one sense, the court's message to the bar is clear: such conduct will rarely be
tolerated. However, the court leaves unanswered the more important questions:
when and why?
CONCLUSION
In Theofilos, an attorney drafted a will which named himself and his son as
beneficiaries, and received a one-year suspension. The Ohio Supreme Court could
have followed a growing trend toward absolutely prohibiting an attorney from
drafting a will naming himself as a beneficiary. This trend serves two purposes:
(1) it sets out clear guidelines for the practitioner, and (2) it protects the interests
of both clients and potential beneficiaries under such wills. However, the court
fell short of its obligation to the legal profession by failing to articulate a clear stan-
dard of conduct for attorneys in Ohio. Until the court does so, attorneys will con-
tinue to walk the boundaries, unaware of exactly when their conduct becomes
unethical.
ERIC C. COTTON
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